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COCK-A-DOODLE-DOO: PANDEMIC
AVIAN INFLUENZA AND THE LEGAL
PREPARATION AND CONSEQUENCES
OF AN H5N 1 INFLUENZA OUTBREAK
N. Pieter M 0 'Learyt
INTRODUCTION
Epidemic disease has long played a role in the evolution of man-
kind. As mankind evolved, disease impacted his laws. With disease
outbreak came chaos, death, and change. As we learned to recognize
the causes of disease, laws attempted to prevent and combat the
threat.' The combat continues today in our global challenge to halt the
spread of devastating diseases like HIV/AIDS.
The greatest pending threat modem man faces from infectious
disease, however, is not a slow moving disease like HIV/AIDS,2 but a
fast moving and virulent influenza outbreak on par with the 1918 pan-
demic.3 Such an outbreak would threaten the political, social, and
legal fabric holding modem society together. Imagine closed schools,
churches, malls, theatres, and grocery stores, as well as prohibitions
on public gatherings of any kind, forced quarantine of civilian popula-
tions, mandatory masking, and harsh restrictions on travel. Further,
imagine the mass slaughter of tens of millions of farm birds under
t J.D., California Western School of Law; M.A., Pepperdine University;
B.A., Wilfrid Laurier University. The author wishes to thank the CWSL library staff,
namely Kim Sterner and Linda Weathers, who located many of the sources used here.
Further, thanks to Kathryn Caretti, Rachel Hartje, & Elisabeth Trefonas for their
editorial suggestions. This article is dedicated to my father.
1 See generally Alexandra Minna Stem & Howard Markel, International
Efforts to Control Infectious Diseases, 1851 to the Present, 292 JAMA 1474 (2004)
(discussing development of laws in response to disease).
2 The AIDS pandemic has killed nearly thirty million people since the early
1980s. DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE
15 (2004) (providing numbers of people living with, having died from, AIDS).
3 JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPic STORY OF THE
DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY 4-5 (2004) (describing the scientific revolution which
followed the outbreak of the influenza of 1918 and how science still benefits from
these discoveries).
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government orders, as happened in Asia.4 Consider the international
relations between highly infected developing nations as they demand
care and assistance from the developed nations. Further, consider the
role of the World Health Organization (WHO) and domestic agencies
like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the
United States. What policy or law-making power would these bodies
have at the height of a pandemic responsible for the death of over
250,000 people a day for a year?'
Based on global influenza surveillance, avian influenza or "bird
flu" represents the most likely cause of the next global influenza pan-
demic.6 In 1997, epidemiologists from around the world observed the
unexplained infection of poultry in Hong Kong and the eventual
spread of avian influenza in Asia.7 Concern grew as human cases were
identified in the late 1990s. 8 Very recently, the realization that "we
4 Over one hundred million birds were slaughtered in Asia between 1997
and early 2004. See Asia's Bird Flu Still Not Contained, Officials Say: New
Outbreaks in Some Countries, According to U.N., MSNBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2004,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 4370795/ [hereinafter Asia's Bird Flu] (last visited Oct. 4,
2005) (discussing the ongoing threat of the bird flu on livestock, economics, and
eating preferences in Africa). In 2004, nearly nineteen million birds were slaughtered
in British Columbia after avian influenza was discovered among poultry on farms in
that province. See Avian Influenza: New Strain of Bird Flu Found in Fraser Valley;
School Closed, MED. VERDICTS & L. WKLY., June 3, 2004, at 31 [hereinafter Avian
Influenza] (describing the effect of avian flu and a possible outbreak in Fraser
Valley).
5 Helen Branswell, Flu Pandemic Near, Experts Fear, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov.
17, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.rense.com/general59/flu.htm (predicting the
grave effect of the avian influenza if preparations for the pandemic are not hastened
because a pandemic is viewed as unlikely). In fact, some estimates are that if a pan-
demic with mortality rates similar to the 1918 pandemic hit, between 36 million and
177 million people would die. Until March 2005, the mortality rate for avian influ-
enza was approximately 72 percent. James Hookway, Bad Diagnosis: In Rural Cam-
bodia, Avian Influenza Finds A Weak Spot; Human Cases Escape Notice Amid Igno-
rance, Poverty as a Pandemic Threatens; Advice: Don 't Eat Sick Birds, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 2005, at Al (discussing an avian influenza mortality rate). Currently, how-
ever, the mortality rate has dropped to approximately 35 percent, suggesting the virus
is adapting to human hosts yet increasing the probability of spreading among the
human population. Alan Sipress, In Vietnam, A Dark Side to Good News on Bird Flu,
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al (providing the avian flu mortality rate in Vietnam).
6 Bird Flu Could Become a Global Pandemic: WHO, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
21, 2005, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.
20050121.wavian0121/BNStory/Intemational/ (discussing how bird flu, given time,
could evolve into the next pandemic).
7 Klaus St6hr, Avian Influenza and Pandemics-Research Needs and Op-
portunities, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 405, 405 (2005) (suggesting approaches to study,
and methods to combat, the avian influenza to prevent a pandemic in humans).
8 Latest Hong Kong 'Bird Flu' Victim Critical: More Animals May Have to
Die, CNN, Jan. 3, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9801 /03/hk.flu.update/ (dis-
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[are] sitting on a time bomb" has set in as the virus shows signs of
human-to-human transmission after seven years.9 Unencumbered hu-
man-to-human transmission represents the last remaining obstacle to
global pandemic.
This article sets out to chronicle the legal preparations nations and
international bodies are making to prevent and prepare for a future
global outbreak of avian influenza as well as combat such a pandemic
outbreak.' ° In order to best understand the potential danger, one must
have an understanding not only of avian influenza, but also a general
understanding of the history of disease and the basic science underly-
ing influenza. Only by recognizing how science and history interplay
with the current concern about avian influenza can one truly appreci-
ate the threat facing humanity. This article sets out to introduce the
reader to the threat of avian influenza and briefly summarize some of
the issues likely to arise during a pandemic. In order to understand the
issue, Part I of this article highlights the scientific aspect of the prob-
lem and sets out to explain where the viral threat originates, how it
spreads, and why it is so unpredictable. Part II provides historical les-
sons for combating viral outbreaks. For example, the events of the
1918 pandemic provide a glimpse of the nightmare scenario modem
scientists and lawmakers fear. 1 Additionally, the SARS outbreak,
originating in China, spreading through the developing nations of
Asia, and reaching developed countries like Canada, highlights the
rapid spread of disease in a world of easy airline travel. Together,
these two examples highlight the necessity of preparing for what in-
cussing human cases of bird flu eight years ago in Hong Kong).
9 Charles Piller, Bird Flu Spate Signals Easier Transmission: Outbreaks
that Killed 12 in Southeast Asia Raise Fears of a Mutated Virus Spread by Humans,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at A3 (quoting Dr. Michael Osterholm, Director of the
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota). See also
Researchers: Girl Passed Bird Flu to Women: Experts Fear Human-to-Human Muta-
tion Could Cause Pandemic, CNN, Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
HEALTH/conditions/01/24/bird.flu.ap/ (discussing human-to-human transmission of
bird flu).
10 This study will focus on the avian influenza A strain (H5N1). Currently,
the avian influenza viruses that have caused illness in people include the H5NI,
H7N7, H7N3 and H9N2 subtypes. See generally Pub. Health Agency of Can., Avian
Influenza, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/influenza/aviane.html#2 (last visited Feb. 5,
2006) (list of online sources concerning avian influenza). H5N 1, however, appears to
cause the most serious illness in humans. In 2003, H5N1 avian influenza was discov-
ered in pigs in southern China, marking the first time pigs were found to be infected
with the H5 subtype of the virus. See St6hr, supra note 7, at 405-06.
1 Anthony S. Fauci, Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Clear and Present
Danger to Humanity, 292 JAMA1887, 1887 (2004) (discussing the 1918 influenza
pandemic).
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creasingly worries epidemiologists specializing in influenza: a swift-
moving global killer cutting down those between twenty and forty
years of age. Part III highlights the legal issues such as quarantine,
isolation, and vaccination of infected individuals and the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Acts. Part IV focuses on the preparations,
both international and domestic, currently being undertaken to moni-
tor and prevent an uncontrollable human-to-human outbreak. It further
enumerates several recommendations designed to facilitate the suc-
cessful monitoring of regional viral outbreaks and to combat an out-
break once it has occurred by striking a balance between legal meas-
ures designed to reduce further spread and a public willingness to
comply.
I. SCIENCE: WHAT IS AN INFLUENZA VIRUS?
In order to answer the legal questions related to influenza in gen-
eral and avian influenza specifically, one must have a cursory under-
standing of what scientists, public health officials, lawyers, and hu-
manity is up against. Without knowing the details of the influenza
virus, one cannot adequately prepare or combat the virus.
A. The Importance of Understanding the Influenza Virus
The influenza virus belongs to the family of viruses known as the
Orthomyxoviridae. 12 The virus is extremely small, measuring 80-
100 nanometers in diameter or approximately one billionth of a
centimeter. 13
The virus particle is a spherical or filament-shaped particle cov-
ered in protein spikes. 14 The interior contains the genetic make-up of
12 R. S. BRAY, ARMIES OF PESTILENCE: THE IMPACT OF DISEASE ON HISTORY
193 (1996) (discussing the scientific specifications of the influenza virus). For greater
scientific detail, see also The Big Picture Book of Viruses: Orthomyxoviridae,
http://www.virology.net/BigVirology/ BVRNAortho.html [hereinafter The Big
Picture Book of Viruses] (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (providing scientific detail about
the Orthomyxoviridae family of viruses).
13 BRAY, supra note 12, at 193. This fact, unknown during the 1918 pan-
demic, reveals the uselessness of the various mandatory masking orders implemented
throughout the world because the fabric, either cloth or gauze, used to make the
masks is unable to filter out the viral particles. See generally ALFRED W. CROSBY,
AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 103 (2nd ed. 2003); and
ANDREw NIKIFORUK, THE FOURTH HORSEMAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF EPIDEMICS,
PLAGUES, FAMINE AND OTHER SCOURGES 154 (1991) (discussing useless masking
orders).
14 The Big Picture Book of Viruses, supra note 12 (discussing the morphol-
ogy of the Orthomyxoviridae family of viruses).
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the virus, the Ribonucleic Acid (RNA)." The surface proteins, he-
magglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N), are the proteins on the A type
influenza virus.16 There are three types of influenza virus: type A, type
B, and type C.' Influenza types A and B cause epidemics of disease
almost every winter. Each year, types A and B are responsible for
infecting 10-20 percent of the population, causing an average of
36,000 deaths and 114,000 hospitalizations. 8 Type A, however, has
been the cause of the great pandemics, while type B causes more local
epidemics.' 9 While both type A and B viruses undergo continual
change, 20 leading to other slightly different forms of the virus and
allowing the viruses to evade the human immune system and thereby
cause infection, only type A has several subtypes21 of the virus that
result from rapid and sometimes drastic changes. The influenza A
virus subtypes are classified based on the virus's two surface proteins,
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, and lead to such subtypes as H3N2
or H1N1.22 Hemagglutinin allows the virus particle to bind to other
"target" cells in the body once they come into contact.23 While the
virus particle and the target cell are bound together, the virus particle
penetrates the target cell, making a host cell.24
Meanwhile, the second protein on the surface of the viral particle,
neuraminidase, prepares for the release of the new viral particles.25
Soon, the host cell is producing copies of the virus rather than its own
genes. Neuraminidase breaks down the surface of the dying host cell
and destroys it.26 Ultimately, the host cell bursts, releasing between
15 THOMAS ABRAHAM, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PLAGUE: THE STORY OF
SARS 136 (2005). For a general description of the difference between the double
helix of DNA and the single helix of RNA, see generally Ariz. State Univ., DNA,
RNA and Protein Synthesis, http://photoscience.la.asu.edu/photosyn/courses/BIO_
343/lecture/DNA-RNA.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
16 GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF
1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 86-87 (1999) (discussing the
make-up of influenza).
7 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
The Influenza (Flu) Viruses, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/fluviruses.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006) (describing influenza).
18 Id.
19 BRAY, supra note 12, at 193.
20 See generally R. Gordon Douglas, Jr. & Robert F. Betts, Influenza Virus,
in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1135, 113 5-46 (1979).
21 Gretchen Reynolds, The Flu Hunters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 7, 2004, at
41 (describing the different subtypes of influenza).
22 Id.
23 BARRY, supra note 3, at 103.
24 Id. at 103-04.
25 Id. at 104.
26 Id.
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one hundred thousand and one million new virus particles to infect
other cells.27 This process continues over and over, ultimately leading
to symptoms of respiratory infection. Fever and sweating are followed
by muscle aches, exhaustion, and violent sneezing and dry coughing.28
During viral reproduction in the host cell, however, mutations in
the replication of the viral RNA occur. 29 These mutations can lead to
catastrophic problems. The virus reproduces so fast and in such great
numbers that there are usually several slightly different strains in each
viral release.30 Most of the copies are too defective to infect other
cells, but approximately one thousand to ten thousand of the newly
copies viruses can carry out further infection.3' Customarily, however,
32there are only slight changes in the virus RNA and protein structure.
This slight change is called an antigenic drift. 33 The result of the anti-
genic drift is that individuals may have immunity to much of the vi-
rus, thereby resulting in only a minor infection.34 Further, a great
many people may have immunity, meaning few people are even made
ill. 35 A danger comes, however, with an antigenic shift, a major
change in the RNA and protein structure of the virus.36 Few people
have immunity because it is so radically different from past viruses
and the antibodies of the immune system would not be able to recog-
nize the invading virus. 37 Accordingly, the virus spreads rapidly, re-
sulting in severe symptoms and increased infection and death rates.38
27 Id.
28 BRAY, supra note 12, at 194. Influenza virus particles are spread in the
respiratory droplets of a person who coughs or sneezes. After their release, they move
through the air and land on the mouth or nose of people nearby. Viruses can also
spread when a person touches respiratory droplets on another person or an object and
then touches their own mouth or nose before washing their hands. See generally Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Influenza: The
Disease, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2005) (pro-
viding a description of influenza); and LYNETTE IEZZONI, INFLUENZA 1918: THE
WORST EPIDEMIC IN AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (1999) (historical account of how influ-
enza overtook the body).
29 LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A
WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 155 (1994) (explaining RNA processes).
30 BARRY, supra note 3, at 105.
31 Id. at 105-06.
32 Id. at 105.
33 GARRETT, supra note 29, at 156.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 World Health Org. (WHO), Communicable Disease Surveillance & Re-
sponse (CSR): Avian Influenza - Fact Sheet (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.who.int/csr/
don/2004 01 15/en/.
37-BARRY, supra note 3, at 111.
38 Id.
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B. Avian Influenza
Avian influenza is an infectious disease found in birds caused by a
type A strain of the influenza virus. 39 It was first identified one hun-
dred years ago in Italy and today is found in all regions of the world.40
The first known cases of human infection with the H5N1 virus strain
were documented in Hong Kong in 1997.41 Based on these first cases,
and fearing a pandemic outbreak, the Hong Kong government ordered
the slaughter of 1.5 million birds. 42 Many in the epidemiological cir-
cles argue the cull staved off a global pandemic.43
As of October 20, 2005, there have been a total of 118 human
cases of laboratory confirmed avian influenza and sixty-one deaths
since January 2004.44 There were six deaths and eighteen confirmed
cases of avian influenza in Hong Kong in 1997. 45 Epidemiologists
have noted, however, that the 1997 H5N1 strain differs genetically
from the 2003 H5N1 strain.46 The differences are the result of con-
stant mutations and adaptations to human hosts as well as the possible
mixing of human and avian influenza strains in infected pigs. 47 To
date, several Asian countries have reported human cases of avian in-
fluenza at some time since 1997.48
Avian influenza is entrenched in bird populations, both wild and
domesticated, in Asia.49 Recently, there have been several suggested
39 WHO, supra note 36.
40 id.
41 WHO, WHO CONSULTATION ON PRIORITY PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS





44 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR): Cumulative
Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N 1) Reported to WHO
(Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/country/casestable
2005_10 20/en/index.html.
45 Tran Tinh Hien et al., Avian Influenza A (H5NJ) in 10 Patients in Vietnam,
350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1179, 1180 (2004).
46 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Outbreaks of Avian Influenza A (H5NJ) in Asia and Interim Recommendations for
Evaluation and Reporting of Suspected Cases-United States, 2004, 291 JAMA 1191,
1191 (2004).
47 Mike Mitka, Health Officials Brace for Flu Season, 292 JAMA 1670,
1671 (2004).
48 These countries include: Cambodia, China (Hong Kong), Vietnam, Thai-
land, Indonesia, and Turkey. See WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response
(EPR): Situation Updates - Avian Influenza, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_
influenza/updates/en/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
49 Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Avian Influ-
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modes of direct bird-to-human infection. For example, in January
2005, two Vietnamese brothers contracted avian influenza (H5N1)
presumably when they ate congealed raw duck blood and herbs given
at a "welcome home" celebration.50 One brother died, but the other
recovered. 51 In September 2004, another young man in Thailand be-
came ill and died after his contact with a fighting rooster used in cock-
fighting.52 According to the Thailand Department of Disease Control,
the young man handled many birds and even helped to clear mucus
secretions from the throat of one bird during a fight by using his
mouth to suck the spit and mucus out of the bird's airway. 53 As a re-
sult, he swallowed some of the spit and mucus and contracted avian
influenza soon after.
54
In early 2005, epidemiologists noted H5N1 acquired the ability to
spread from person-to-person rather than simply from bird-to-
human.55 This direct human-to-human transmission enables H5N1 to
spread rapidly among humans and is the final step before a pandemic
can result.
II. CONTAGIOUS DISEASE AND THE LESSONS OF
HISTORY
Disease has impacted the course of human history in dramatic
ways. During the Peloponnesian War in 429-430 B.C., Thucydides
chronicled the demise of Athens and its leader, Pericles. 56 The Athe-
enza in the United States, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/ai-us/ai-us.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2005); Charles Piller, Many Scientists Fear Bird Flu Cases Exceed
Data; Minimal Reports from Laos and Cambodia and Unreliable Test Results Else-
where Suggest that the Virus' Progress has been Underestimated, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2005, at A11.
50 Nga Pham, Eyewitness: Surviving Bird Flu, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4226459.stm.
51 Id.
52 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 39. A Thai rock band's new album entitled
"Big Mouth 5: Bird Flu," however, is critical of efforts to vaccinate or cull poultry.
Further, declaring that cock fighting is "a way of life," the lead singer, Ad Carabao,
defends the practice of cock fighting in Thailand saying that to "ask[ ] Thais to give
up cockfighting is like asking Americans to abandon baseball." See Charles Piller,
Squawking at Bird Flu Warning; A Thai Rock Star Rises to the Defense of Cockfight-
ing, Saying Instituting a Ban and Killing the Fowl Won't Quell Disease Concerns,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at Al.
53 Reynolds, supra note 21, at 39.
5 id.
55 Charles Piller, Bird Flu Spate Signals Easier Transmission, Outbreaks that
Killed 12 in Southeast Asia Raise Fears of a Mutated Virus Spread by Humans, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2005, at A3.
56 BRAY, supra note 12, at 9.
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nian city-state was forced into an unfavorable peace settlement with
Sparta resulting in the end of the Athenian golden-age. 57 In another
example, when Spanish conquistadors invaded the New World they
brought with them the diseases of the Old World which killed mil-
lions. 58 There were an estimated twenty-five to thirty million Amerin-
dian people living in Mexico at the time of conquest, but within sixty
years the population of Mexico had shrunk to only three million,59
leaving the land and riches of the new world ripe for the taking. Many
argue the influenza pandemic of 1918 was a major reason World War
I ended in November 1918.60 The combatants were simply running out
of healthy men to fight. More recently, SARS revealed the speed with
which today's viruses can travel around the world.
A. The 1918 Influenza Pandemic
61
The 1918 influenza outbreak was unlike anything the world had
seen before for several reasons. First, it was far more virulent than any
other recorded influenza outbreak in history.62 Second, it specifically
struck down those between the ages of twenty and forty. 63 Third, the
pandemic spread faster than any other in history.64
Influenza generally kills one-tenth of 1 percent of those it in-
fects. 65 The 1918 virus, 66 however, killed 2.5 percent of those it in-
fected.67 In the United States this deceptively low percentage resulted
in more American deaths from influenza than from combat 68 with
57 See WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 105-06 (1976).
18 Id. at 201-02.
" Id. at 203-04.
60 NIKIFORUK, supra note 13, at 154.
61 There is growing realization that the 1918 virus and the current avian
influenza virus are similar in several ways. See Charles Piller, Killer 1918 Flu Gives
Clues to New Virus, Scientists Reconstruct the Source of the 20th Century Scourge
and Find it Shares Mutations with the Bird Influenza in Asia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2005, at Al.
62 Mark S. Klempner & Daniel S. Shapiro, Crossing the Species Barrier-
One Small Step to Man, One Giant Leap to Mankind, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1171,
1172 (2004).
63 BARRY, supra note 3, at 4.
64 Id. at 5.
65 KOLATA, supra note 16, at 7.
66 The 1918 influenza A virus strain is believed to be HINI. See Klempner
& Shapiro, supra note 62, at 1172.
67 KOLATA, supra note 16, at 7.
68 CROSBY, supra note 13, at 11. The number of American military deaths
during World War I was approximately 58,000. See Military Casualties of World War
One, http://www.ysursa.com/history/West%20Civ/Textbook/WWI-casualties.htm
(last viewed Mar. 9, 2006).
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over 670,000 Americans in total dying from influenza.69 Estimates of
global infection and death rates vary due to the overwhelming nature
of the outbreak and inadequate record keeping. 70 However, overall
infection rates have been estimated at over one billion people between
1918 and 1919 7 or approximately 40-50 percent of the population.
72
Death rates also vary considerably, but estimates commonly range
between twenty and forty million deaths due to influenza during the
pandemic.73 Still, some estimates suggest fifty to one hundred million
deaths.74
The second reason the 1918 pandemic was so devastating was be-
cause it struck down those typically most resistant to influenza-
young adults-like nothing before it.75 The 1918 outbreak targeted
those in ideal health. Death from influenza came rapidly. At first, pa-
tients would report to the hospital with flu-like symptoms. 76 Rapidly,
they would develop severe pneumonia-like symptoms and, in some
cases, dark mahogany spots over their cheekbones. 7 Within hours,
cyanosis 78 could be seen extending from their ears to their face. Death
came only hours later.79 Doctors were unable to cope with the magni-
tude of the outbreak and were forced to watch helplessly as their pa-
tients died swift, excruciating deaths. 80
Finally, the rapid spread of the contagion far surpassed anything
in recorded history. More people died of influenza in one year than
Black Death killed in one century. 81 Influenza killed more people in
twenty-four weeks than AIDS killed in twenty-four years.82
69 IEZZONI, supra note 28, at 17.
70 BARRY, supra note 3, at 396.
71 GARRETr, supra note 29, at 158.
72 BRAY, supra note 12, at 197-200.
73 GARRETIr, supra note 29, at 158.
74 Branswell, supra note 5, at Al; Reynolds, supra note 21, at 39; KOLATA,
supra note 16, at 7; BARRY, supra note 3, at 4.
75 GARRETr, supra note 29, at 154.
76 BARRY, supra note 3, at 232.
77 NIKIFORUK, supra note 13, at 15 1.
78 Cyanosis, as Barry writes, "occurs when a victim turns blue because the
lungs cannot transfer oxygen into the blood. In 1918 cyanosis was so extreme, turning
some victims so dark-the entire body could take on color resembling that of the
veins. . .. " BARRY, supra note 3, at 187-88.
79 Id. at 188. For audio oral interviews from survivors of the 1918 influenza
pandemic see History Matters: The U.S. Survey Course on the Web, http://
historymatters.gmu.edu/search.php?function=find&keyword=Spanish+Or+1 918+And
+Influenza&x=8&y=8 (search "Spanish or 1918 and influenza") (last visited Mar. 9,
2006). 80 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 133-34.
81 BARRY, supra note 3, at 5.
82 id.
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By modem standards, the 1918 influenza virus moved slowly. It
crossed the globe in the infected bodies of young soldiers sailing
aboard transatlantic steam ships to and from the war front in Europe.83
Port cities and military bases were usually the first to be infected.84 In
the United States, the virus moved from the port cities of the east
coast to the west coast by car and train.85 Today, with international air
travel, viruses move from one continent to another overnight. They




SARS, many believe, represents the future of viral outbreaks.
With the ease and speed of international travel, SARS symbolized the
swift spread of disease from developing countries to developed coun-
tries. It has become the model of concern for international public
health and international public health law. 88
First emerging from Foshan City, Guangdong Province, China in
November 2002,89 there were eventually a total of 8,098 reported
SARS cases worldwide. 90 Of these, 774 died.91 China suffered 5,327
cases as of July 31, 2003.92 SARS, however, spread from China to the
hardest hit western city, Toronto, Canada, in early 2003. 93 In Canada,
there were 251 reported cases and forty-four deaths due to SARS ac-
83 CROSBY, supra note 13, at 38-39.
84 Id. at 48.
85 Id. at 63-64.
86 Approximately 1.5 billion people travel by air each year. ABRAHAM, supra
note 15, at 11.
87 SARS stands for "Severe-Acute Respiratory Syndrome." Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS): Fact Sheet: Basic Information About SARS, May 3, 2005, http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm.
88 Paul Arshagouni, An Introduction to Medical Issues Posed by Interna-
tional Health Threats in a Legal Framework, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L. L. 199, 201
(2004).
89 Id. at 202.
90 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 87.
91 There is some conflict on this point. Some argue over nine hundred deaths
were reported worldwide due to SARS. See generally Id.; and Colleen M. Flood &
Anthea Williams, A Tale of Toronto: National and International Lessons in Public
Health Governance from the SARS Crisis, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L. L. 229, 229 (2004).
92 WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1
November 2002 to 31 July 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004 04
21/en/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
93 Ian B. Cowan, The Day SARS Came to Town: The Court's Role in Pre-
venting Epidemics, 39 COURT REV. 4 (2003), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/
courtrv/cr39_4/cr39-4.pdf.
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cording to the WHO.94 In the United States, only eight people had
laboratory evidence of infection.95 It only took four months for the
illness to spread to Hong Kong, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Can-
ada.96 It eventually spread to twenty-six separate countries.97 Overall,
the mortality rate for SARS was about 3 percent in young adults and
approximately 50 percent in the elderly, while the overall average
mortality rate was about 9 percent of those infected.98 Canada had
approximately a 17 percent mortality rate, the same as China.
99
There were many "firsts" associated with the SARS outbreak, 00
but from a public health law perspective, it represents the first truly
global infectious disease threat of the twenty-first century. 01 SARS
impacted international airline travel, 0 2 tourism, 10 3 and national
interests of various countries. 1' 4 Further, the outbreak stressed the
importance of global cooperation 0 5 and raised questions of how to
balance public health concerns with respect for individual rights.
10 6
Most importantly, however, the SARS outbreak revealed the
importance of the WHO in coordinating a global response to
combating infectious disease.
10 7
94 There is also conflict on the number of deaths in Canada. See generally
WHO, supra note 92; and Flood & Williams, supra note 91, at 229.
9F Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 87.
96 Arshagouni, supra note 88, at 202.
97 WHO, supra note 92.
98 Arshagouni, supra note 88, at 201; WHO, supra note 92.
99 WHO, supra note 92.
10o For example, SARS was the first time this type of coronavirus was identi-
fied in human beings. See FIDLER, supra note 2, at 5.
'o' Id. at 6-7.
102 See generally Ruwantissa Abeyratne, International Responsibility in Pre-
venting the Spread of Communicable Diseases through Air Carriage-The SARS
Crisis, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 53 (2002).
103 C. David Naylor et al., Learning From SARS in Hong Kong and Toronto,
291 JAMA 2483, 2485 (2004).
104 China, hoping to join the World Trade Organization, hid the first cases of
SARS from the world. As the crisis worsened, China believed it was in its best inter-
est to deny or downplay the outbreak. ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 102-03.
105 See Clayton L. Thomason, It's a Small World after All: Global Health and
Ethical Lessons ofSARS, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L. L. 313, 315-16 (2004).
106 David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post- Westphalian
Pathogen, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 485, 485 (2003).
107 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 81-106. "SARS strengthened
the lesson that we live in a global village [and] the importance of surveillance [ ] in
that [Asian] region." Telephone Interview and Follow-up Email with Christine Pear-
son & Dave Daigle, Spokespersons, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Apr.
22, 2005) [hereinafter Pearson & Daigle Interview] (on file with author). According
to CDC officials, the CDC "linked labs" with the WHO during the SARS outbreak,
"which proved very useful and a model for the future." Id.
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When SARS broke out in late 2002, scientists took it as the initial
stages of another global pandemic akin to the 1918 pandemic.'
0 8
SARS, however, was the "dress rehearsal" for a threat like avian in-
fluenza poses. 10 9 SARS exposed gaps in communication as well as
response." 0 Further, such a relatively minor outbreak revealed large
gaps in health services, even in developed countries like Canada."'
These lessons will guide the WHO, national governments, local medi-
cal care providers, and the world through the next global pandemic. If
an avian influenza pandemic were to occur, national governments
would be overwhelmed. Health care facilities, health care workers,
and other essential services would be unable to cope. 12 Accordingly,
the individual national governments must begin to plan for an out-
break of avian flu. While the WHO monitors the progress of the virus,
it is the responsibility of national governments to ensure their coun-
tries are prepared and their citizens informed. National governments
must, however, work to balance protective health measures with a
respect for the law and civil liberties.
III. THE LAW AND AVIAN INFLUENZA
Effectively combating infectious disease outbreaks requires bal-
ancing legal controls and civil liberties. Without a balance, individuals
and nations alike disregard the law in pursuit of their own interests.
Accordingly, the efforts of governments and international organiza-
tions to inform and regulate the conduct of citizens may be ignored if
legal controls are too stringent. Stringent legal controls may lead to
public disregard, and consequently, the continued, unabated spread of
the contagion. Clearly, there are numerous legal issues related to an
infectious disease such as avian influenza: measures designed to pre-
pare for a possible outbreak, issues of quarantining or isolating sus-
pected cases once an outbreak has occurred, and international surveil-
lance and reporting of infection outbreaks. Further, the legal aspects
108 Id. at 135.
'o9 Id. at 140.
110 Rita R. Colwell, Dir., Nat'l Sci. Found., Dr. Colwell's Remarks: SARS:
Lessons Learned for the Future (June 4, 2003), http://www.nsf gov/od/lpa/forum/
colwell/rc030604strategicassessment.htm.
111 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 140. To many experts, SARS was a relatively
minor outbreak. To highlight this sentiment, Abraham writes that Klaus St6hr, coor-
dinator of the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance Program, declared that
"[clompared [to] a flu pandemic, SARS will be something to smile about." Id. at 135.
12 See The Univ. of Toronto Joint Ctr. for Bioethics, Ethics and SARS:
Learning Lessons from the Toronto Experience, http://www.yorku.ca/igreene/sars.
html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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of a large-scale viral outbreak have numerous domestic and interna-
tional ramifications.
A. The World Health Organization
The WHO is the primary international body for addressing the po-
tential threat to global health posed by avian influenza."1 3 The WHO
is a United Nations (UN) organization and was created in 1948.114
Although other UN organizations play a role in monitoring and at-
tending to international health,1 5 it is the WHO that provides leader-
ship in international health law."16 Under Article 55 of the UN Char-
ter, one of the goals of the UN is to promote solutions to international
health problems.' t7 Thus, the WHO has the responsibility of imple-
menting the goals of the Charter in respect to matters of health."18
According to the preamble of the WHO Constitution, every human
being has a fundamental right to the "highest attainable standard of
health ... without distinction [to] race, religion, political belief, eco-
nomic or social condition." 1 9 In order to accomplish this goal, WHO
member states,12 0 under Article 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution,
can agree to adopt binding regulations, such as the International
Health Regulations (IHR). l2 1 The IHR embodies the organization's
efforts to control infectious diseases.122 Revised on May 23, 2005, the
purpose of the IHR is to "prevent, protect against, control and provide
a public health response to the international spread of disease ... and
113 Michelle Forrest, Note, Using the Power of the World Health Organiza-
tion: The International Health Regulations and the Future of International Health
Law, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 153, 153 (2000).
114 Stem & Markel, supra note 1, at 1477.
115 Other UN organizations that play a role in monitoring and attending to
international health include UNICEF, FAO, UNEP, UNDP, UNFPA and the World
Bank. See Allyn L. Taylor, Governing the Globalization of Public Health, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 500, 503 (2004) ("[O]rganizations with significant involvement in the
health sector include WHO, UNICEF, FAO, UNEP, UNDP, NFPA and The World
Bank.").
116 Id. at 504.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 WHO CONST. pmbl., available at http://w3.whosea.org/aboutsearo/pdf/
const.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
120 For a complete list of the 192 member states, see WHO, Countries,
http://www.who.int/ countries/en/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
121 Forrest, supra note 113, at 161-62.
122 DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS
ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 129 (2000) (discussing the
International Health Regulations).
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[ ] avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade."
, 123
The revisions to the IHR stem from the experiences of the last
thirty years and strive to implement a more "coordinated international
response to the spread of disease" in light of the 2003 SARS outbreak
and the current avian influenza crisis in Asia.124 The first IHR, called
the International Sanitary Regulations when first adopted by the WHO
in 1951, were renamed the IHR in 1969 and later modified in 1973
and 1981.125 The initial intent was to monitor six infectious dis-
eases, 126 but has now come to be the primary weapon against the
global spread of all infectious disease.
To accomplish its task, the IHR requires member states to report
outbreaks of infectious diseases 27 and maintain public health capa-
bilities at all points of entry. 128 Article 6 of the revised IHR, for exam-
ple, mandates a state notify the WHO within twenty-four hours after a
disease is identified as originating within its borders. 29 Each member
state is required to notify the WHO "by the most efficient means of
communication" of all disease "events" which may "constitute a pub-
lic health emergency of international concern. 1 30 States are required
to "continue to communicate" with the WHO and provide detailed
information related to the number of cases and deaths, laboratory re-
sults, sources of infection and risks, as well as conditions affecting the
spread of the disease and all health measures deployed to halt its
spread. 131
In the area of surveillance, each member state is required to
"develop, strengthen, and maintain, as soon as possible but no later
than five years from entry into force ... the capacity to detect, assess,
notify and report events.'' 32 Moreover, each member state is required
123 WHO, Third Report of Committee A: Revision of the International Health
Regulations at 9, A58/55, May 23, 2005, http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/
WHA58/A58 55-en.pdf [hereinafter IHR (2005)].
124 Press Release, WHO, World Health Assembly Adopts New International
Health Regulations, May 23, 2005, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/
2005/pr wha03/en/index.html.
15 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR), International
Health Regulations (IHR), http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006)
(discussing the history and purpose of the IHR).
126 Id. See also FIDLER, supra note 2, at 33 (criticizing the IHR for its limited
scope of disease coverage prior to the May 2005 revision).
127 IHR (2005), supra note 123, at 11-15.
128 Id. at 19-29.





to designate or establish a "National IHR Focal Point" within its
borders. 33 The National IHR Focal Point is the national contact point
for all WHO communications. 134 It serves to "disseminat[e]
information [ ] and consolidate input" from national sources
responsible for surveillance, public health, ports of entry, and other
governmental departments.
35
Taking into account other non-governmental sources of informa-
tion, the revised IHR states that the WHO "may take into account
reports from sources... and then communicate [the] information" to
the member state where a disease outbreak is occurring. 36 The "other
reports" the IHR speaks of refer to information available over the
Internet or from other organizations monitoring and reporting on
health issues in a given country. The WHO verifies with the member
state that a disease outbreak is occurring, and "only where it is duly
justified may [the] WHO maintain the confidentiality of the
source."'
137
In respect to monitoring various ports of entry, member states
may require a traveler to furnish information of destination, itinerary,
or review relevant health documents.' 38 Further, travelers may be sub-
ject to "non-invasive medical examination" and have their baggage,
cargo, or other goods inspected for public health purposes. 139 Travel-
ers, however, are to be permitted to continue an international voyage
if there is no imminent public health risk and the member state in-
forms the authorities of the traveler's presence to the port of entry at
the traveler's destination.1
40
In determining when a public health risk of international concern
threatens to spread, the WHO Director-General shall consult with the
government of the member state to determine the risk and recommend
a course of action.14' If the Director-General and the government offi-
cials disagree as to the determination an international public health
risk is present in its territory, the Director-General may convene a
meeting of the Emergency Committee to consider the threat and make
recommendations. The Director-General of the WHO, however, has
133 Id. at 10.
134 Id. at 8.
131 Id. at 10.
136 Id. at 12.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 20.
139 Id. at 21.
140 Id. at 24.
141 Id. at 14.
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the final determination to communicate the risk and recommendations
to the general public. 
42
Ideally, the revised IHR will provide the power to address the
growing threat from infectious disease, but will be tested on current
avian influenza threat. The revised IHR also affords new strength to
address situations like issuing unilateral travel advisories while
encouraging the goals of greater communication, surveillance, and
cooperation.
These international measures, however, were not in existence
during the 1918 influenza pandemic and the previous IHR were
initially ignored during the first weeks of the SARS outbreak in 2002-
2003. In fact, China, where the SARS virus originated, refused to
cooperate with the WHO during the early, most crucial stages of the
SARS outbreak. 143 Chinese governmental officials wrongly believed
they could control the disease and feared economic reprisals for
declaring an outbreak of a previously unknown virus.1 44
Consequently, when the disease first appeared in November 2002,
Chinese officials said nothing. 1
45
Fortunately, unlike SARS, this failure to cooperate and the fear of
economic hardships is minimal during the early stages of the current
avian influenza outbreak occurring in Asia. Officials from affected
Asian countries have identified the infection and made reports of
avian influenza cases and deaths in their countries and reported them
to the WHO. 146 While the IHR provides the legal framework for deal-
ing with global infectious disease control, the WHO's Global Out-
break Alert and Response Network is responsible for investigating
potential global outbreaks of infectious disease.147
142 Id. at 33.
143 Gabriel M. Leung et al., The Public Health Viewpoint, in AT THE
EPICENTRE: HONG KONG AND THE SARS OUTBREAK 55, 63 (Christine Lob ed., 2004).
144 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 102-03.
145 Naylor et al., supra note 103, at 2484.
146 WHO, supra note 44.
147 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES:
ASIAN SARS OUTBREAK CHALLENGED INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES,
GAO-04-564, at 9 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04564.
pdf.
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The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) ac-
tively monitors the evolving avian influenza situation in Asia for the
WHO. 48 Created in 1998,149 GOARN is designed to collect and ana-
lyze information from a variety of sources including government,
nongovernmental organizations, and the Internet. 150 GOARN uses the
technical and operational resources from scientific institutions in
Member States, "networks of laboratories, United Nations organiza-
tions (e.g., UNICEF, UNHCR), the Red Cross (International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and national societies) and international humanitar-
ian nongovernmental organizations (e.g., Mrdecins sans Frontires
[ ])" in an effort to collect data and control the international spread of
outbreaks.' 51 GOARN operates according to the Guiding Principles
for International Outbreak Alert and Response. 52 News of avian in-
fluenza outbreaks reaches the WHO through its web of labs and insti-
tutions operating around the world. Further, GOARN has played a
vital role in learning the real story of SARS even when the Chinese
government was refusing to cooperate.153 While originally operating
"without formal legal authority or express policy approval from WHO
member states," that changed in 2001 when the member states granted
GOARN the power to conduct global surveillance.1
54
148 WHO, WHO/SEARO Meetings, Ninth Meeting of Health Secretaries of
Countries of SEAR: Establishment of Regional Cooperation on Avian Influenza
Prevention and Control, http://w3.whosea.org/en/Section1430/Section1439/Sectionl5
90/Section1591/Section1594/Section1596_6511.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). The
CDC is one of the WHO's "collaborating centers and supports the WHO with team
members for outbreaks and lab surveillance." Pearson & Daigle Interview, supra note
107. For example, CDC officials are working with the WHO and the Vietnamese
Ministry of Health "to investigate influenza H5N 1 in Vietnam and provide help in
laboratory diagnostics and training to local authorities." Id.
149 FIDLER, supra note 2, at 66.
0 Id. at 67.
151 WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR), Global Out-
break Alert & Response Network, http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
152 WHO, Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and Response,
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/guidingprinciples/en/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2006). The guiding principals are designed "to prepare for field activity, to activate
international support, to coordinate response in the field, [and] to evaluate and follow
up outbreaks of international importance." Id.
153 Alexandra A. Seno & Alejandro Reyes, Unmasking SARS." Voices From
the Epicentre, in AT THE EPICENTRE: HONG KONG AND THE SARS OuTBREAK 1, 11
(Christine Loh ed., 2004) (stating the "war on SARS was.., the first time the WHO
has coordinated such a large number of laboratories").
154 FIDLER, supra note 2, at 67.
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GOARN is aware, however, its surveillance is not 100 percent
and concerns about various countries have arisen. For example, some
question Cambodia's surveillance of the problem. 155 Cambodia lies
between Thailand and Vietnam and there are fears of gaps in the sur-
veillance net and official responses to confirmed outbreaks have been
very hesitant. 56 WHO officials report villagers are fearful of telling
officials about sick poultry or flu-like symptoms in their neighbors for
fear of the government ordering the mass slaughter of their animals. 1
57
Laos, also between Thailand and Vietnam, has yet to report a single
case of avian influenza in either birds or humans in 2005.158 Further,
in Vietnam, human cases of avian influenza are being missed. 59 Re-
cently, seven new cases were identified from samples of thirty Viet-
namese patients who had previously not shown symptoms. 60 This
data suggests that while there is little evidence of actively hiding of
cases or downplaying the severity of the situation, questions are be-
ginning to arise regarding gaps in the defenses. Consequently, Canada
has sent additional health officials to Southeast Asia in an effort to
encourage governments throughout the region to be more forthcoming
in reporting cases of avian influenza.161
The WHO, however, is the international monitoring device that
will alert the world when avian influenza threatens a global
pandemic. 62 When avian influenza causes several outbreaks in at
least one country, has spread to other countries, and has caused
serious morbidity and mortality, the WHO will declare an
international pandemic.
163
155 Hookway, supra note 5, at Al (discussing the problem of identifying,
containing, and treating the bird flu in Cambodia).
1y6Id. There are reports that many people in rural Cambodia have not even
heard of bird flu, thus raising fears the virus is still spreading and is almost impossible
to monitor. Sitting Ducks: Bird Flu Is Now Endemic in Asia. This Is Frightening for
Everyone, EcoNoMiST, Apr. 16, 2005, at 35, 35 (discussing the bird flu in Asia and
public health efforts to contain it).
117 Bird Flu Kills 2 More in Southeast Asia, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar.
26, 2005, at A21.
158 Piller, supra note 49, at A11. See generally WHO, supra note 44.
159 Piller, supra note 49, at A11.
160 Gautam Naik, Flawed Bird-Flu Data in Vietnam Fuels Concerns, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 10, 2005, at A2.
161 Fear of Global Plague Sparks Research Trip, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 24,
2005, at 27.





B. International Ramifications of an H5N 1 Avian Influenza Outbreak
A global outbreak of avian influenza would have a profound im-
pact on international air travel and trade. Considering the international
impact HIV/AIDS has had, a fast moving virulent outbreak of avian
influenza would require swift, far-reaching action by the WHO and
individual nations. For example, airline travel may be restricted and
travel advisories implemented by the WHO in order to restrict the
spread of the virus. Nations could also restrict entry of individuals
arriving from infected regions of the world out of fear of spreading the
disease. Further, international trade may suffer and individual nations
may ignore their obligations under international treaties.
1. Impact on Airline Travel
Contagious disease continues to spread along military and trade
routes with human beings. Contagious disease, however, now travels
these routes at supersonic speeds. 164 Contagious disease respects no
borders and carries no passport. International air travel has rendered
the idea of national quarantine measures obsolete. 165
Airline travel, like transoceanic ships in 1918, present an ideal
environment for the spread of influenza.166 Passengers are cramped
together for long periods of time and breathe recycled, dry air.167 Air-
lines use high-efficiency particulate air filters to filter cabin air aboard
aircraft while in flight.168 While these are the same kind of filters used
in hospital emergency rooms, 169 planes built after the mid-1980s recy-
cle only up to 50 percent of their air in order to save on fuel costs.17
When one passenger is ill, the cabin environment is an ideal atmos-
phere to spread a virus.171 One episode from the SARS outbreak illus-
trates the speed with which a virus can spread. On March 15, 2003, a
164 FIDLER, supra note 122, at 70 (discussing how globalization has led to
greater spread of infectious disease).
165 See id. at 70-71. As an example of a successful national quarantine strat-
egy, Australia successfully prevented the 1918 influenza pandemic from breaching its
borders until very late in the outbreak. BARRY, supra note 3, at 375-76.
166 GARRETnr, supra note 29, at 569-70.
167 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis in the Aircraft
Cabin-Issues ofAir Carrier Liability, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 41, 43-44 (2000) [hereinafter
Abeyratne, Tuberculosis].
168 Anita Jean Smith, Comment, Cabin Air Quality in Aircraft: What Is the
Problem? What Is Being Done or What Can Be Done about It? Who Can Do It and
How?, 61 J. AIRL. &COM. 721, 730 (1996).
169 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 92.
170 Smith, supra note 168, at 726.
171 GARRETr, supra note 29, at 569.
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seventy-two-year old man boarded a flight in Hong Kong destined for
Beijing. 172 He had recently visited his sick niece in a hospital in Hong
Kong and was ill when he boarded the flight.'7 3 From his seat, he in-
fected twenty-one other people on the flight, including those sitting
seven rows away. 174 He infected two stewardesses from Mongolia
who in turn spread the virus to nearly three hundred people in that
country. 175 Several other people of different nationalities destined for
various parts of the world caught and spread the virus as well.1
7 6
During the SARS outbreak, the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization issued guidelines on issuing informative leaflets to arriving
passengers on SARS, screening of arriving passengers for symptoms,
radioing ahead if a passenger appeared to be infected with SARS,
instructing crew members on how to deal with suspected SARS cases
while in flight, and disinfecting an aircraft which had a SARS infected
passenger aboard.177 Other organizations such as the International Air
Transport Association worked closely with the WHO to coordinate a
response to the SARS outbreak, recognizing the threat a large-scale
outbreak would have on the airline industry.1
7 8
The primary body of law governing infectious disease and air
travel is the Convention on International Civil Aviation.7 9 Article 14
of the Convention mandates contracting states take the lead and enact
measures to prevent the spread of communicable disease during air
travel. 80 During the SARS outbreak, for example, the Canadian gov-
ernment issued Health Alert notices to all arriving and departing pas-
sengers.' 8 ' The notices outlined how to identify symptoms associated
with SARS. 82 Further, each passenger was required to provide con-
tact information in order for government health officials to identify




176 Id. Four Taiwanese workers, a Chinese government employee en route to
Thailand, and a Finnish labor organization official were all infected on board and
contributed to the spread of SARS. Id.
P7 Press Release, Int'l Civil Aviation Org., ICAO Issues Guidelines Regard-
ing SARS (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/pio200307.htm.
178 Abeyratne, supra note 102, at 58-59.
179 Abeyratne, Tuberculosis, supra note 167, at 45. See Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation art. 14, Dec. 7, 1944, available at http://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/
research/treaties/airlaw/public/.
1:0 Abeyratne, Tuberculosis, supra note 167, at 45.
181 Health Canada, Health Alert Notice: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome




him in the event one of his fellow passengers developed symptoms. 1 3
Later, the notices were amended to include questions about travel and
personal health. 84 Anyone answering "yes" to any one of the ques-
tions was sent for an interview with a government health nurse.
185
Additionally, major airports were outfitted with thermal screening
devices that would monitor passengers walking passed in an effort to
identify individuals with high temperatures and, therefore, possibly a
SARS case. 186 Individual airlines, however, also could potentially face
liability for their actions of allowing an obviously sick individual to
board a plane.
187
Airlines owe passengers a duty of care to protect that person from
harm. If one passenger contracts a contagious disease in flight from
another passenger, the airline may be liable if it is found to have
knowingly allowed an infected person to travel on the plane or
willfully blinded itself by not investigating the infected passenger's
symptoms. 88 Moreover, under the Montreal Convention of 1999,189
an airline may be liable for injury suffered during flight.190 Further,
under the Warsaw Convention of 1929,191 passengers who are
wounded or injured during flight may have a cause of action against
an airline. However, the issue is whether contracting an infectious
disease like avian influenza while aboard an aircraft constitutes injury
or wounding. 92 No such cases have arisen, however, and this remains
an issue for future litigation. During a large-scale avian influenza
outbreak, however, national governments- would closely monitor
arriving passengers for signs of infection and, consequently, airlines
would have an interest in vigilantly monitoring the health of their
boarding passengers.
183 Flood & Williams, supra note 91, at 242.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Pub. Health Agency of Can., Thermal Image Scanners to Detect Fever in
Airline Passengers, Vancouver and Toronto, 2003, 30-19 CAN. COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE REPORT 165, 165 (2004), http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/
04vo130/dr30l9ea.html.
187 See generally Abeyratne, supra note 102.
188 Id. at 61.
189 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 17, May 28, 1999, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.
unification.convention.montreal. 1999/portrait.pdf.
190 Abeyratne, supra note 102, at 61. See also Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art. 17.
191 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air art. 17, Oct. 12, 1929, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.
carriage.warsaw.convention. 1929/portrait.
192 Abeyratne, supra note 102, at 64.
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2. Travel Advisories
During an avian influenza outbreak, national governments and the
WHO would issue travel warnings against nonessential travel to in-
fected areas. Such was the case with the SARS outbreak. 193 The WHO
issued travel advisories for Hong Kong and the Guangdong Province
of China. 194 Later, a travel advisory for Toronto, Canada was is-
sued.' 95 Canadian officials, angered by what they perceived as an un-
necessary warning, strongly petitioned the WHO to lift its warning.'
96
Citing severe damage to local business and the tourism industry, the
travel advisory was lifted in only days.
197
During the SARS outbreak, however, some argue the WHO went
beyond its authority in the IHR by implementing the travel adviso-
ries. 19 These were in fact the first travel advisories ever issued by the
WHO. 199 The advisories were warnings directed at individual travel-
ers, not at WHO member states.200 Further, there appears to have been
no consensus among the member states for the issuing of the travel
advisories. 20 1 Rather, Harlem Brundtland, 20 2 the Director-General of
the WHO, seeking to avoid controversy, issued the initial alert without
consulting member states.20 3 Brundtland was praised by her col-
leagues because they understood she did not want the WHO blamed
later for failing to warn the world of a new infectious disease.2 °
193 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 92.
194 FIDLER, supra note 2, at 90.
195 Press Release, WHO, WHO Extends its SARS-Related Travel Advice to
Beijing and Shanxi Province in China and to Toronto, Canada (Apr. 23, 2003),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2003/np7/en/.
196 Christine Loh, The Politics of SARS: The WHO, Hong Kong and Mainland
China, in AT THE EPICENTRE: HONG KONG AND THE SARS OUTBREAK 139, 147 (Chris-
tine Loh ed., 2004).
197 FIDLER, supra note 2, at 92; WHO, Update 42 - Travel Advice for Toronto,
Situation in China (Apr. 29, 2003), http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_04_29/
en/.
198 Fidler, supra note 106, at 495. These were the IHR in place during the
2003 SARS outbreak, not the recently revised IHR of May 2005.
199 Flood & Williams, supra note 91, at 243.
200 Fidler, supra note 106, at 495.
201 Id.
202 WHO, Director-General's Office: Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, http://www.
who.int/dg/brundtland/en/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2005). Dr. Brundtland is the former
Prime Minister of Norway. WHO, Director-General's Office: Dr Gro Harlem
Brundtland, Director-General, http://www.who.int/dg/brundtland/en/index.html (last
visited Dec. 29, 2005).
203 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 86-87.
204 Id. at 87.
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The controversy regarding the issuing of alerts and travel adviso-
ries is unlikely to erupt again if avian influenza begins to spread the
same way SARS did. While acting beyond its authority, the WHO
acted under its mandate to monitor disease and prevent its spread. To
have done otherwise would have allowed the illness to further estab-
lish itself and left many uninformed. Brundtland's decision, although
controversial, was correct and, ideally, such decisions would be made
in the event of a large-scale avian influenza outbreak.
3. Impact on Trade
Avian influenza is likely to have a drastic impact on trade should
the outbreak become widespread. Trade routes and goods exchanged
in trade are often another mode of transportation for infectious dis-
ease. Government officials may act to restrict or ban the entry of
goods or vessels from infected areas, fearing introduction or spread of
a disease. Rejecting trade agreements or operating through the agree-
ments' adjudication procedures, nations may disregard their commit-
ments during an outbreak. Moreover, fearing a negative impact on
trade, government officials could delay the announcement of the pres-
ence of an outbreak in their country. For example, China covered up
initial SARS cases fearing trade implications and its application to the
WTO.2 °5
Under the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), as well as other multilateral and bilat-
eral trade agreements, a balance has been struck between a nation's
right to restrict the entry of contaminated goods and disciplinary ac-
tions designed to punish a nation for misusing the protectionist health
measures. 20 6 Such protections were implemented in Europe in 2003
when the European Commission, fearing a fresh outbreak of another
strain on avian influenza, banned the export of poultry and hatching
eggs from the Netherlands. °7
Moreover, during the avian influenza outbreak among poultry in
British Columbia in 2004, several nations around the world suspended
imports of Canadian poultry products.20 8 Japan, South Africa, the
205 Id. at 102.
206 FIDLER, supra note 122, at 219-21. Under article XX(b) of the GATT, as
Fidler notes, a nation has the right to restrict trade to protect public health. See id at
221-23. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XX(b),
GATT Secretariat, Geneva, July 1986, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs e/legal e/.
207 Dutch Tighten Poultry Controls as Flu Spreads: Netherlands, AGRA EUR.,
Mar. 14, 2003, at NI.
208 See generally COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE 2004 OUTBREAK OF HIGH
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European Union, and the United States all limited their import of Ca-
nadian poultry products in some way due to the outbreak.20 9 During an
avian influenza outbreak, nations would presumably restrict the im-
port and export of poultry and poultry products in the same way some
nations restricted imports of beef from countries where "Mad Cow"
disease is present.21 °
In conclusion, an avian influenza pandemic would have wide-
spread impact on international affairs and the law. The outbreak will
affect all aspects of travel, trade, and civil liberties. Just like several
nations restrict the movement and entry of HIV/AIDS infected people
or require proof of vaccinations for certain disease prior to being ad-
mitted entry, such policies would likely appear during an avian influ-
enza outbreak.2 1' Further, developing nations, such as the Asian coun-
tries currently experiencing avian influenza outbreaks, would demand
medical care and financial assistance from the developed nations. This
has already occurred in Vietnam.212 When faced with their own mas-
sive outbreaks and response, developed nations would not likely have
the resources to assist developing nations with their plight. Conse-
quently, they would be left to suffer.213
Domestically, however, there are numerous ways for a nation to
address a large-scale outbreak of avian influenza. Preparation is the
PATHOGENICITY AvIAN INFLUENZA (H7N3) IN THE FRASER VALLEY OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA, CANADA (Wayne Lees ed., 2004), http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/
anima/heasan/disemala/avflu/2004rep/introe.shtml (providing an executive summary
of the 2004 outbreak of avian influenza in Canada). The strain of avian influenza that
hit British Columbia in 2004 was not the H5N1 strain discussed in this paper, how-
ever. The strain was the H7N3 and symptoms in humans were restricted to eye infec-
tions. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
What You Should Know about Avian Flu, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-
info/avian-flu-humans.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
209 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Avian Influenza: Trade and Interna-
tional Relations (Apr. 13, 2004), http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/
disemala/avflulbacdoc/intemate.shtml.
210 The real name for Mad Cow is bovine spongiform encephalopathy. For a
discussion on the trade impact of Mad Cow, see ATrAH BOAME ET AL., MAD COW
DISEASE AND BEEF TRADE: AN UPDATE 1 (2004), available at http://www.statcan.ca/
english/research/l 1-621-MIE/1 1-621-MIE2004010.pdf. For a synopsis of the current
trade bans in place related to avian influenza, see U.S. Dep't of Agric., Avian Influ-
enza Trade Ban Status as of 2-23-05, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/aius/ai_
trade-ban status.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2005).
211 See FIDLER, supra note 122, at 296-97.
212 Bryn Nelson, Global Threat: Experts Say Deadly Virus Presents Grave
Risk if We Don't 'Get Our Act Together', NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 2005, at A03.
213 See Thomas Crampton, Cost of Fighting Bird Flu Is Said to Rise, INT'L.
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 26, 2005, at 10.
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initial concern, but once an outbreak has been recorded, other meas-
ures are likely to be implemented.
C. Domestic Ramifications of an H5N 1 Outbreak
Ultimately, each nation would be left to provide for the health and
safety of its citizens, whether through vaccinations, quarantines, isola-
214tion, or mandatory masking. However a nation chooses to battle the
outbreak, there will be charges that civil liberties were trampled upon.
What government officials must consider, therefore, is a balance be-
tween public health measures to halt the spread of the virus and main-
taining public support for government policy.
In the United States, states are primarily responsible for public
health unless there is an effect on interstate commerce, when it then
becomes a matter of federal concern.215 Most states, however, have
passed some type of Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA), which, among other things, calls on health care providers
to report all persons infected with a contagious disease that may cause
a public health emergency, enables governors to declare a state of
emergency, and even authorizes the confiscation and rationing of per-
216sonal property. In Canada, public health care is largely a matter of
provincial concern; however, there is overlap with federal and mu-
nicipal governments. 1 7 Usually, the more local forms of government
take the lead in issuing laws related to infectious disease control.
1. Mandatory Masking
During the 1918 pandemic, several American cities, including San
Francisco, implemented mandatory masking ordinances. Believing
voluntary masking by citizens reduced the number of influenza cases
and deaths during late September 1918, the San Francisco Board of
Health recommended to the Board of Supervisors 218 that all San Fran-
214 For a definition of these terms, see MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT (Draft for Discussion 2001), available at http://publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. For a detailed background of MSEHPA, see generally
Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Toward State Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95,
96-101 (2005).
215 Thomason, supra note 105, at 318. See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 25-41 (2000).
216 Brown, supra note 214, at 98-99; Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and
Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622 (2002).
217 Flood & Williams, supra note 91, at 234-35.
211 San Francisco's Board of Directors is the equivalent of another city's city
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ciscans be ordered to wear a mask. 21 9 The zealous Chief of the Board
of Health declared if compulsory masking were implemented, influ-
enza "[would] be under control in a week., 220 The San Francisco or-
dinance read, in part:
Every person appearing on the public streets, in any public place,
or in any assemblage of persons or in any place where two or more
persons are congregated, except in homes where only two members of
the family are present, and every person engaged in the sale, handling
or distribution of foodstuffs or wearing apparel shall wear a mask or
covering except when partaking in meals, over the nose and mouth,
consisting of four-ply materials known as butter-cloth or fine mesh
221gauze.
Influenza lingered in San Francisco longer than one week. It did
not dissipate until early 1919.222 Numerous people, however, were
charged for violating the San Francisco masking law. To some, masks
were a nuisance and inconvenience. Others thought it humiliating and
unconstitutional to be compelled to wear a mask.22 3 Resistance grew.
The Anti-Masking League was formed by civil libertarians and smok-
ers who were caught by the thousands and arrested. 24 Police raided
hotel lobbies in one mass sweep and arrested four hundred people
who had slipped their mask down around their chins in order to smoke
221
a cigarette.
During the SARS outbreak, numerous individuals wore masks
226
in public and to work.227 There were, however, no masking laws en-
acted during the SARS outbreak. If a large-scale outbreak of avian
influenza occurred, it is difficult to imagine modem day masking or-
dinances. While many individuals would voluntarily mask them-
selves, being ordered to purchase and wear a mask is likely to raise
constitutional challenges.
council.
219 CROSBY, supra note 13, at 102.
220 Id. at 102.
221 Id. (citing S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 18-20, & 24, 1918 and Board of Supervi-
sors of the City and County of San Francisco, 13 J. OF PROCEEDINGS 900-01 (1918)).
222 Id. at 114.
223 Id. at 105.
224 NIKIFORUK, supra note 13, at 154.
225 CROSBY, supra note 13, at 105.
226 The ideal mask was (and remains) the N95 respirator which is approved by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). See WHO, WHO
Interim Recommendations for the Protection of Persons Involved in the Mass Slaugh-
ter of Animals Potentially Infected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses
(Jan. 26, 2004), http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/csr/documents/.
227 Upon arriving at Toronto's Pearson International Airport on May 1, 2003,
the author was greeted by Canadian Customs officials wearing masks.
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2. Quarantine
Quarantine, like isolation, represents the ultimate restrictions on
an individual's civil liberty: the restriction of movement. Quarantine
and isolation are two different measures, however. Quarantine is a
large-scale restriction of a population's movement.228 Historically,
quarantine was the detention of people suspected of carrying a dis-
ease, primarily travelers. 229 Today, quarantine measures restrict the
movements of healthy individuals believed exposed to an infectious
disease during its period of communicability in order to prevent future
transmission.230 There are various levels of quarantine, including
travel advisories warning people about travel to certain regions, travel
restrictions preventing travel to infected areas, canceling public
events, and curfews.23' One provision in the MSEHPA, however, em-
powers health officials to use "every available means to prevent the
transmission of infectious disease and to ensure that all cases of con-
tagious disease are subject to proper control and treatment., 232 Ac-
cordingly, health officials can quarantine individuals for up to fifteen
days (ten more days if a petition is filed by the health authority) be-
fore that person has a right to be heard by a court.23 3
One of the most flagrant abuses of a quarantine measure
implemented in the United States comes from the case Jew Ho v.
Williamson. In Jew Ho, the court struck down a quarantine measure
restricting the movement of people living within a twelve-block area
of San Francisco after nine cases of bubonic plague were
diagnosed.234 The quarantine measure in question, however, applied
only to people of Chinese ancestry. 35 In Jew Ho, the court declared it
would uphold any "reasonable regulation" imposed for protecting
people from the disease.236 It further declared it would "give the
widest discretion" in construing the regulations adopted by the Board
228 Thomason, supra note 105, at 318.
229 GosTrIN, supra note 215, at 209.
230 Id. at 210.
231 See Thomason, supra note 105, at 318.
232 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH PowERs ACT § 601 (Draft for Discus-
sion 2001), available at http://publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
233 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605. For a critique and
a breakdown of which states passed the MSEPHA see Nat'l Vaccine Info. Ctr., What
You Need to Know about the Proposed Model State Emergency Health Powers Act in
Your State, http://www.909shot.com/ActionAlerts/whatyouneed-to-know.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
234 Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1900).
235 Id. at 13.
236 Id. at 21.
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of Health or the Board of Supervisors.237 The court, however, struck
down this quarantine measure as discriminatory and consequently
void under the Constitution.
238
3. Isolation
Isolation applies to individuals who are personally restricted from
contact with others.239 Isolation pertains to infected persons, whose
movements and contacts are restricted in order to prevent further
transmission of the outbreak.
240
During the SARS outbreak in Toronto, judges were called on to
deal with issues of quarantine, isolation, and forced treatment. As
SARS developed in Toronto, medical officers wanted to invoke
special powers under the provincial Health Protection and Promotion
Act.241 The statute, as one judge described it, allows medical officers
to bring applications, supported by evidence, before judges stating
that the officer has ordered a person into treatment or quarantine and
the person refused to comply.242 The police can be ordered to
243
apprehend the person if necessary. One case resulted in a person
suspected of being infected with SARS being detained by police and
transported to a hospital quarantine facility, where a hearing involving
lawyers and the judge was conducted by telephone. 244 Generally,
however, people complied with quarantine orders during SARS.245 In
cases dealing with quarantine measures set up in prisons and further
restricting the movements of prisoners,246 Ontario courts credited
237 Id.
238 Id. at 26.
239 Thomason, supra note 105, at 318.
240 GOsTIN, supra note 215, at 210. For example, Toronto's first case of SARS
died at home with her family members present. Her SARS was unrecognized so early
in the outbreak. Days later her son became ill and was admitted to the hospital where
he also died. Four other family members soon began to exhibit symptoms and were
immediately put into isolation wards in four separate Toronto area hospitals.
Tomislav Svoboda et al., Public Health Measures to Control the Spread of the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome During the Outbreak in Toronto, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED.
2352,2358 (2004).
241 Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, §§ 22, 36, 39 (2005).
242 Cowan, supra note 93, at 4.
243 Id.
244 Id. The case in question, however, was moot in that the medical officer
withdrew his quarantine order after determining the individual had not been exposed
to SARS. The individual, however, had been subject to forcible confinement for three
days. Id.
245 Id. at 6.
246 During the height of the SARS outbreak in Toronto, prisoners had their
family visits cancelled, contact with lawyers was severely limited (allowed by tele-
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prisoners three days of time served for each day they endured the
hardships of heightened lockdown during the SARS outbreak in
Toronto.
During the 1918 pandemic, the public challenged other measures
implemented to restrict the spread of the disease. For example, in
Globe School Dist. No. 1 of Globe County, Arizona v. Board of Health
of the City of Globe, the local school board sought to enjoin its local
board of health and city officers from enforcing a local closing order
compelling schools to close.247 The closing ordinance declared it
unlawful for two or more people to congregate at theatres, movie
houses, banks, businesses, pool halls, dances, schools, and churches
during the 1918 influenza outbreak.24 8 The school board argued it was
beyond the authority of the local Board of Health to pass such a dras-
tic closing order.249 The local board of health, however, based its clos-
ing order on the advice of doctors at a conference of members of state
and local boards of health, which was convened to address the large
number of cases and deaths due to influenza.250 The Arizona Supreme
Court held that while an emergency clearly existed, "to concede that
any board of health has been delegated the legislative power to de-
clare what is or is not a nuisance is to concede that boards of health
may be delegated legislative power, and this cannot be done. ' '251 No
law gave the local board of health this authority.252 The court struck
down the portion of the regulation giving the local board of health the
authority to declare what constituted a nuisance, but found the local
board of health had the power to issue a closing order. The closing
order was an "emergency measure, to be effective only during the
emergency requiring it. '253 The court declared Arizona's Board of
Health was empowered to make and enforce all rules to prevent, cure,
and halt the spread of any contagious disease. Its powers, however,
were administrative, but "[t]he emergency calls forth the occasion to
exercise the power to protect the public health.,
25 4
Another example of a challenge to a local closing order came in
C. J. Alden v. State where the appellant was arrested for violating a
phone through a glass partition), all volunteer programs were cancelled in an effort to
prevent prisoners from being exposed. See generally The Queen v. Blake, 2003
W.C.B.J. 7686; and The Queen v. Bhangal, 2004 O.N.C.J. 266.
247 Globe Sch. Dist. No. I v. Bd. of Health, 20 Ariz. 208, 209 (1919).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 210.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 211.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 214.
254 Id. at 218.
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local board of health regulation mandating all movie houses be closed
in order to prevent the spread of influenza.255 Appellant Alden chal-
lenged the constitutional authority of the local board of health to enact
rules compelling him to close his place of business.256 The court de-
clared the regulations were reasonable to prevent the spread of the
virus and that the board acted well within its powers during the 1918
epidemic.251
During an avian influenza outbreak, similar objections to various
quarantine, isolation, or closing orders can be expected. 58 Currently,
public resistance to government measures to prevent the spread of the
virus among birds have already taken shape. In Vietnam, for example,
when WHO officials expressed grave concerns about the spread of
avian influenza among the domestic bird population, local farmers
objected to recently enacted bans on keeping birds.259 In Vietnam,
"backyard farmers" raise about 90 percent of the country's poultry.260
The WHO recommends these farmers keep all birds out of their
homes and segregate different species of birds.26' Some have already
voiced concern, however, that jobs are being lost and local business is
suffering because, in a country where 50 percent of all households
keep and raise birds for food and for sale, curbing sales and requiring
separate pens for the animals is too much to ask of a subsistence
farmer.262
Further, in Thailand, there is growing discontent among farmers
as they watch their flocks killed off to prevent an outbreak.263 Some
255 C. J. Alden v. State, 20 Ariz. 235, 235 (1919).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 236.
258 During the SARS outbreak, for example, China implemented many of the
same measures related to the closing bans discussed above. Closing orders are univer-
sal measures designed to prevent the spread of a viral contagion like SARS or avian
influenza. See John Gittings, Beijing Theatres and Bars Closed In Crackdown,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ sars/story/0,13036,
944819,00.html. For a critique of MSEHPA see generally Nat'l Vaccine Info. Ctr.,
supra note 233,
259 Charles Piller & Thomas H. Maugh I, The World; Poultry Farming Re-
form Urged to Curb Bird Flu; World Health Officials Meeting in Vietnam Say Cur-
rent Conditions Could Lead to a Global Epidemic and Ask The West to Provide Aid,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at A4.
260 Id.
261 Vietnamese Farmers Urged to Curb Bird Flu, CTV.cA , Feb. 23, 2005,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/ 109117564589104526764?
hub=Health.
262 Piller & Maugh II, supra note 259, at A4.
263 Michael Specter, Nature's Bioterrorist: Is There Any Way to Prevent a
Deadly Avian-Flu Pandemic?, NEW YORKER, Feb. 28, 2005, at 54-55.
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find the new regulations difficult to comply with.26 Others are upset
at the loss of their livelihoods.265
Closing businesses represent loss of jobs, income, and consumer
spending power. Closed schools means parents are responsible for the
daylong care of their children. Restricting what farmers can sell or
how to keep their livestock cause resentment. All play to undermine
government efforts to prevent, contain, or reduce the impact of avian
influenza. Furthermore, the sweeping powers enumerated in the
MSEHPA frighten individuals who recognize the potential for gov-
ernment action during an emergency without a legal check from the
courts, thereby impinging upon their civil rights.266 To maintain bal-
ance, the public must be informed. They must be made aware of how
their personal actions impact the spread of the virus. Swiftly imple-
mented government regulations, however, threaten to undermine age-
old cultural and societal traditions, especially in Asia.
4. Vaccinations
Currently, there is no one vaccine for the avian influenza virus in-
fecting Asia because the virus is continually mutating.267 Some coun-
tries are stockpiling doses of general avian influenza vaccines, but at
the moment there is no vaccine specifically for the H5N 1 outbreak in
Asia.268 In the event of pandemic outbreak of avian influenza, it would
take over six months to develop and test a vaccine.
2 69
264 Id. (discussing farmers being forced out of business and their grumblings
about aspects of the new regulations such as having to change clothes each time they
enter a chicken house).
265 id.
266 GOSTIN, supra note 215, at 472.
267 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Key Facts: Information About Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A
(H5N1) Virus (Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm; Tele-
phone Interview with Christine Pearson, Spokesperson, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (Mar. 30, 2005).
268 See generally WHO, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR),
Availability of H5N1 Prototype Strains for Influenza Pandemic Vaccine Development
(Feb. 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/guidelines/avian_
influenza _prototypestrains/en/. This website also discusses legal issues of intellec-
tual property, licensing, and genetically modified organisms related to the production
of any virus strains utilized in vaccinations. Id.
269 WHO, Informal Consultation on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in
Countries with Limited Resources at 9, WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2004.1, June 23-25,
2004, available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/en/CDS_
CSRGIP_2004I.pdf. Only recently has the Bush administration come out and
declared intent to bolster vaccine production in the United States. Bernard Wysocki,
Jr., US. Sees Need to Better Prepare Against Avian Flu: As Pandemic Concerns
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The Swine Flu threat of 1976, however, is the precedent for large-
scale, swift vaccination of a civilian population against influenza.27 °
Over forty million Americans, one third of the population, were vac-
cinated during the fall of 1976.27 This was the largest vaccination
program in American history.272 However, there were several prob-
lems associated with the Swine Flu vaccination program which must
be avoided by any vaccination program implemented to deal with an
avian influenza outbreak. Liability issues, however, were the primary
problem with the vaccination program.273 Insurance company officials
feared liability of possible side effects from the vaccinations and in-
formed pharmaceutical companies they could not provide liability
insurance.274 Congress acted quickly, fearing an outbreak.275 It hastily
passed the Swine Flu Act of 1976276 and implemented President
Ford's plan to vaccinate every American.277 The Act was passed so
quickly that there were no hearings or committee reports and the ma-
jority of legislators did not read the Act.278 The Act, however, pro-
vided that the federal government would bear the liability for any
complications arising from vaccinations. 279 When people started to die
or become ill after being vaccinated, however, media attention worked
to undermine the public support.280 The program ended in December
1976 when increased incidence of side effects was noted.281' The me-
dia, many argue, exaggerated the health effects of swine flu and the
risk of illness or death due to vaccination.282
The federal government must not fear overreacting to avian influ-
enza like it did to the swine flu outbreak in 1976. The media must
Grow, White House Aims to Boost Vaccine Production at Home, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
2005, at Al.
270 GOSTIN, supra note 215, at 185-86. Swine Flu originated as an outbreak of
influenza among arm recruits in 1976. The CDC identified the virus and feared an-
other outbreak of influenza along the lines of the 1918 influenza pandemic. Officials
at the CDC advised President Gerald Ford to implement a mass vaccination program.
Id. See generally GARRETr, supra note 29, at 153-91.
7, Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir. 1984).
272 id.
273 GOSTIN, supra note 215, at 186.
274 Id.
275 Unthank, 732 F.2d at 1519-20.
276 42 U.S.C. § 247h0)-() (1994 & Supp. 2005).
277 Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1982).
278 KOLATA, supra note 16, at 164. See also Unthank, 732 F.2d at 1519-20.
279 GOSTIN, supra note 215, at 186.
280 KOLATA, supra note 16, at 165-66.
281 GOSTIN, supra note 215, at 186 (discussing Guillain-Barrd syndrome re-
sulting from vaccinations).
282 Id. at 187.
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collaborate with government in the face of a real or likely threat. To
overreact is far more excusable than to delay. Waiting until avian in-
fluenza is present and spreading is too late to implement a nationwide
vaccination program. Further, just as the American federal govern-
ment accepted liability for complications arising from vaccinations, so
should other governments who choose to implement a nationwide
avian influenza vaccination program. To do otherwise hinders efforts
to prevent the spread of the virus. Accordingly, nations should de-
velop avian influenza vaccination programs and have them ready to
implement once avian influenza begins to spread.
Another issue to consider is forced vaccinations of individuals.
Section 603 of the MSEHPA empowers public health officials "to
vaccinate persons as protection against infectious disease and to
prevent the spread of contagious disease or possibly contagious
disease., 283 Should avian influenza develop into a serious threat to the
nation's security, forced vaccination could be conducted and would
likely be upheld by the Supreme Court. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
the Court held that a compulsory smallpox vaccination had a
substantial relation to the protection of the public health and safety of
the state of Massachusetts.284 The defendant argued his liberty was
invaded by forced vaccination, but the Court reasoned that for the
benefit of all, certain restrictions and restraints on liberty were needed
for the common good.285 To hold otherwise, the Court declared, would
"strip the legislative department of its function to care for the public
health and the public safety when endangered by epidemics of
disease.,
286
In conclusion, on the domestic front, a nation must maintain a
balance between legal controls and public willingness to comply. Im-
plemented laws should remain feasible for daily living, but strictly
enforced.287 Forced vaccinations, mass quarantine, or long-term isola-
tion without access to legal counsel should be avoided for fear of an
erosion of public support and trust. Further, nations should develop
plans to implement if avian influenza begins to spread uncontrollably.
Local, provincial, and federal levels of government must establish
protocols delineating responsibilities. Lines of communication must
283 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 603 (Draft for Discus-
sion 2001), available at http://publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
284 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1905). See generally Wendy E.
Parment et al., Individual Rights Versus Public's Health-]O0 Years After Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED., 652-54 (2005).
285 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
286 Id. at 37.
287 WHO, supra note 269, at 5.
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be established. No nation will be able to fend off the virus alone.
Preparation is the key.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The emergence of human cases of H5N1 avian influenza and di-
rect human-to-human transmission of the virus is a warning.288 The
governments of the world as well as health organizations must prepare
for the possibility of a global pandemic outbreak. National govern-
ments, health care providers, medical researchers, and the public must
cooperate to stem the threat.289
Internationally, the WHO should continue to lead the global
monitoring and response to the outbreak.290 It is the only public inter-
national health organization with broad international support, legal
authority, and public health expertise to address the emerging threat
posed by an avian influenza pandemic. Moreover, WHO officials and
researchers have the unique ability to monitor avian influenza activity
in closed countries such as North Korea.29'
Domestically, however, there is much individual nations can do to
prepare and deal with an outbreak. Adopting a national plan to combat
an outbreak of pandemic influenza, stockpiling of vaccines and anti-
viral drugs,292 and establishing priority rankings of who would receive
these drugs are important. Moreover, increasing surge capacity in
hospitals is essential to handling the number of sick people who will
require medical assistance and strain medical services.293 Physicians
must be trained to identify potential avian influenza patients, and
nursing staff must be trained to inquire into a patient's travel his-
tory. 294 Finally, clear and established lines of communication must be
in place in order to direct the response to the outbreak.295 Without
288 See St6hr, supra note 7, at 407.
289 Stem & Markel, supra note 1, at 1478.
290 Telephone Interview with Christine Pearson, supra note 267. Ms. Pearson
stated that the WHO is the "primary lead" in the global effort to monitor and combat
the threat posed by avian influenza. Id.
291 Barbara Demick, Bird Flu Hits N. Korea In Sore Spot: The Destitute Na-
tion Has Made A Rare Success of Poultry Production, Which Now Faces Disaster,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at Al. News reports have confirmed the presence of
H5N1 avian influenza in North Korea. Sitting Ducks, supra note 156, at 35.
292 The Bush administration plans to purchase twenty million doses of
Tamiflu, but as of October 2005, the United States had only stockpiled enough to treat
4.3 million people. Wysocki Jr., supra note 269, at Al.
293 Robert A. Weinstein, Planning for Epidemics-The Lessons of SARS, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED., 2332, 2334 (2004).
294 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 46, at 1191.
295 Weinstein, supra note 293, at 2334.
HEALTH MATRIX
these measures, nations will be unprepared, citizens uninformed, and
hospitals overburdened. This will result in an increased reliance on
quarantine, isolation, and closing orders, which increase the likelihood
of public resentment and general disobedience.296
A. Preparations for an Eventual Outbreak
After the SARS outbreak, there were renewed calls for more
comprehensive preparations, both internationally and domestically,
for a global outbreak of disease.297 However, even before the 2003
SARS outbreak, in April 1999 the WHO's Department of Communi-
cable Disease Surveillance and Response convened a meeting in Ge-
neva, Switzerland to discuss the role of the WHO and national and
regional planning for an influenza pandemic.298 The purpose was to
assist medical and public health leaders in responding to future threats
and to recommend all countries establish national pandemic planning
committees in order to develop national strategies in dealing with a
future pandemic. 299 Noting air travel would accelerate the spread of
the new virus and health care systems would be "overburdened,
economies strained, and social order disrupted," it was determined
that a preparation plan could not feasibly halt the spread of the virus,
but could minimize the consequences of an outbreak.300
In the United States, the General Accounting Office (GAO) pro-
duced a report in October 2000 highlighting issues such as stockpiling
vaccinations and antiviral drugs as well as developing plans to iden-
tify priority groups who would receive these drugs should a pandemic
erupt.30 1 Today, many nations either have or are currently developing
296 See St6hr, supra note 7, at 406-07.
297 Naylor et al., supra note 103, at 2485.
298 WHO, Influenza Pandemic Plan. The Role of WHO and Guidelines for
National And Regional Planning, WHO/CDSlCSR/EDC/99. 1, Apr. 1999, available at
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/whocdscsredc99 1.pdf.
299 Id. at 5.
300 Id.
301 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: PLAN NEEDED FOR
FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSE (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d014.pdf (discussing the primary issues of vaccines, vaccination development, and
antiviral stockpiling). The United States government also addressed the issue of an
avian influenza preparation plan or a general influenza pandemic plan in 2000. Infec-
tious Diseases: A Growing Threat to America's Health and Security: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on International Relations 106th Cong. (2000), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/intrelations/106ch.html (follow "Hrg. No.
106-146" hyperlink) [hereinafter Infectious Diseases]. Further, the General Account-
ing Office issued a report on this topic in 2004. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ASIAN SARS OUTBREAK CHALLENGED
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
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plans to combat an influenza pandemic. 30 2 All nations, however,
should develop a plan to address pandemic outbreaks of disease and
should be encouraged to comply with the IHR.
B. Educating the Public
30 3
As noted in hearings before the Committee on International Rela-
tions on June 29, 2000, it is difficult to galvanize the public to the
issue of infectious disease when the disease is a slow-moving killer in
a far-off part of the world.304 Although media reports carry news of
the avian influenza outbreak, both local inhabitants and foreign travel-
ers are often left uninformed. For international travelers traveling to
and from infected regions in Asia, announcements should be made
aboard conveyances. Announcements made aboard commercial air-
lines, for example, should wam passengers who experience flu-like
symptoms to seek immediate medical attention. Travelers should be
expressly warned about coming into contact with both domesticated
and wild birds as well as eating local delicacies comprised of un-
cooked poultry. Further, physicians, nurses, and other medical staff
should be trained to inquire about a patient's recent travel history
when interviewing a patient complaining of flu-like symptoms.
305
In Asia, the dangers of avian influenza must be emphasized.30 6
Local doctors and health care providers must be taught how to recog-
new.items /d04564.pdf.
302 See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., CANADIAN PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA PLAN (2004), available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/
index.html; NAT'L COMM. ON AvIAN INFLUENZA CONTROL, NATIONAL STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA CONTROL IN THAILAND (2005), available at
http://www.tatnews.org/ccc/2480.asp; N.Z. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NEW ZEALAND
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC ACTION PLAN VERSION 14 (2005), available at http://
www.moh.govt.nz/pandemicinfluenza (follow "New Zealand Influenza Pandemic
Action Plan Version 14" hyperlink); U.K. HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY, INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN (2005), available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/
topics az/influenza/pdfs/HPAPandemicplan.pdf. The United States currently has a
draft of its plan. NAT'L VACCINE PROGRAM OFFICE, DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DRAFT: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN (2004), available
at http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/pandemicplan/finalpandemiccore.pdf.
303 For a detailed assessment of risk perception related to avian influenza in
Hong Kong, see Richard Fielding et al., Avian Influenza Risk Perception, Hong Kong,
11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 677 (2005).
304 Infectious Diseases, supra note 301, at 3.305 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 46, at 1191.
306 For example, when an ill Vietnamese woman who had cared for her re-
cently deceased brother was brought to a local clinic suffering from an unknown
illness, the medical staff, not aware of avian influenza, sent the woman home with
instructions to perform a ceremony to appease angry spirits. James Hookway, supra
note 5, at Al.
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nize the symptoms and contact government authorities when a sus-
pected case is identified.3 °7 Further, farming practices must be altered
to reduce the risks of spreading the virus not only among domesti-
cated birds, but also from domesticated to wild migratory birds or to
other mammals, such as pigs. Altering animal husbandry practices in
Asia, however, while a major step in restricting the spread of the con-
tagion, is unlikely to be implemented soon enough to stem the current
outbreak.30 8
However, people who are unaware of or do not "worr[y] about in-
fectious diseases do not support prevention programs and do not ap-
preciate the need for changes in their way of life., 30 9 Such awareness,
however, only comes from properly funded education.
C. Economic Support
Funding measures aimed at promoting awareness and control of
avian influenza must be increased and implemented. The UN's Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) met in Vietnam in February 2005 to discuss
avian influenza. They assessed the avian influenza threat and advised
on new control measures. 3 Together, the two organizations called for
a three-year, $100 million international investment at the national
level in Asia.311 Further, in May 2005, the WHO held an inter-country
meeting to assess the avian influenza crisis.312 While not specifying
amounts, the WHO called for international organizations to coordinate
their resources and declared "support should be given to capacity
building as well as urgent or emergency solutions. 31 3
Ideally, the WHO should create a global avian influenza fund by
coordinating donations and funding. As the world leader in addressing
307 See id.
308 Farmers 'Key to Bird-Flu Control', CNN.coM, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.
cnn.com/2005/HEALTH/conditions/02/23/bird.flu.asia/.
309 Scott Burris, Law as a Structural Factor in the Spread of Communicable
Disease, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1755, 1765 (1999).
310 MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., Gov'T OF VIETNAM, REPORT OF THE
SECOND FAO/OIE REGIONAL MEETING ON AVIAN INFLUENZA CONTROL IN ASIA 10-12
(2005), available at http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/documents/ai/AI 2nd
RegMtg _HoChiMinhCityRep.pdf [hereinafter VIETNAM REPORT].
31T Id. at 9.
312 WHO, WHO Inter-Country Consultation: Influenza A/H5NJ in Humans in
Asia at 6-7, WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.7, May 6-7, 2005, available at http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/H5N 1 %20Intercountry%20Assessment%20final.
pdf.
313 Id. at 6.
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the issue, the WHO has the resources and knowledge to properly di-
rect the monies and monitor their use.
D. Local Public Health Care in Asia
Medical and scientific facilities in Asia as well as local infrastruc-
ture must be improved to facilitate communication, access to patients,
and transportation of medical supplies. Facility and infrastructure im-
provements, however, rely on an increase in awareness and funding.
For example, local medical care providers must have access to more
sophisticated training and testing equipment.3 14 Current levels of train-
ing and the use of outdated equipment in Vietnam recently led to the
discovery of previously "overlooked cases" of avian influenza, which
were diagnosed after retesting. The current situation highlights the
need to improve local health facilities.
315
E. Prevention
Several measures can be implemented to prevent to the spread of
avian influenza, but prevention measures rely on an educated public
and properly funded initiatives.
1. Surveillance
While the WHO, through GOARN, is responsible for much of the
global surveillance of the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases
like avian influenza, national governments must play a greater role in
detecting and monitoring outbreaks in their initial stages. Focusing on
avian influenza, governments in affected countries must be encour-
aged to establish laboratories and monitoring stations throughout their
countries. All information gathered must be consolidated and commu-
nicated to the WHO in compliance with the IHR.
Local government officials must be encouraged to monitor the
health of birds for sale in markets as well as the health of migratory
wild birds within their territory. Bird smuggling must be vigilantly
monitored and game fighting banned.
2. Culling
Recognized as having helped to avoid a large scale pandemic
among birds in 1997, the mass culling of infected birds must be im-
314 See Piller, supra note 49, at A 11.
315 Naik, supra note 160, at A2; VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 310, at 7.
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plemented.316 Many consider culling the first line of defense against
an encroaching threat.31 7 Accordingly, to foster compliance, local
farmers should be adequately compensated for their property and en-
couraged to comply.
3. Hygiene
Proper hygiene in all countries should be stressed. In Asia, contact
with wild and domestic birds should be reduced, open-air markets
disinfected or even closed, and all contact with the mucous and other
bird secretions halted. Finally, proper hand-washing should be empha-
sized in all regions.
CONCLUSION
Although the world is currently facing "the gravest possible dan-
ger" of a global pandemic,318 the WHO and individual nations have
reacted appropriately.319 The magnitude of the 1918 influenza out-
break and swift spread of the SARS virus in 2003 have guided epide-
miologists in their reactions to the present outbreak. Together, these
past two outbreaks indicate that if left to spread, avian influenza has
the potential to be an unprecedented, fast moving, global killer.3
316 See generally Asia 's Bird Flu, supra note 4; and Avian Influenza, supra
note 4.
317 Compare WHO, Avian Influenza Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/avian-faqs/en/index.html#control
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006) (discussing how the seriousness of a potential avian influ-
enza pandemic may require the killing of certain birds) with Food & Agric. Org. of
the United Nations, Avian Flu: No Need to Kill Wild Birds: Better Biosecurity Meas-
ures Are Essential for Safer Poultry Production, July 16, 2004, http://www.fao.org/
newsroom/en/news/2004/48287/index.html (stating the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation's desire to urge countries to refrain from killing wild birds in response to avian
influenza outbreaks).
318 Brett Popplewell, City Braces for Flu Outbreak: Ottawa Ready to Respond
if Avian Flu Does Eventually Hit Capital, Officials Say, OTTAWA SUN, Feb. 25, 2005,
at 10.
319 For example, New Zealand recently made a mass purchase of oseltamavir,
an anti-viral drug effective against the avian influenza virus. See Geoffrey Lean & Jan
McGirk, Worldwide Pandemic' of Bird Flu Predicted, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb.
27, 2005, at 20. Twelve countries in total have placed orders to stockpile the antiviral
drug oseltamavir (Tamiflu) and another twelve are negotiating to purchase the drug.
The high cost of the drug, manufactured by Roche, is prompting countries like Thai-
land to consider producing their own supply, under emergency licensing laws. Sitting
Ducks, supra note 156, at 36.
32°The WHO suggests that in the best case scenario, the H5NI avian influ-
enza strain would kill between two and 7.4 million people, infect 1.2 billion people,
and hospitalize twenty-eight million. Other estimates indicate that sixty million peo-
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Nations must prevent the erosion of trust among citizens and work to
ensure people are informed about the various responses that may be
taken should the outbreak spread. If the public loses trust in the gov-
ernment during a large-scale epidemic, mass dissent and disregard for
public health measures and law may result.321 In such a lawless envi-
ronment, the avian influenza virus would spread rapidly, further un-
dermining all law.
pie could die of avian influenza in a full blown outbreak. Sitting Ducks, supra note
156, at 36.
321 Thomason, supra note 105, at 319; Barack Obama & Richard Lugar, Op-
ed, Grounding a Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2005, at 19.

